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i INTRODUCTION 
Lump sum payments for non-economic loss - to be or not to be? 
That, inter alia, was the question which faced the Royal Commission 
of Inquiry set up in 1967 to report upon the compensation for personal 
injury in New Zealand. 
At this stage, injuries were compensated either through the common law or under 
the Workers' Compensation Act 1956. Both avenues were less than perfect. 
The former was based on proof of negligence, or invoked by the doctrine of 
res ipsa locguiter. It was categorised by cost and delay. The lump sum damages 
which were awarded were subject to reduction if the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent. In the opinion of the Royal Commission, chaired by Woodhouse J 
(as he was then): 
"The remedy itself produces a complete indemnity for a relatively tiny 
group of injured persons; something less (often greatly less) for a small 
group of injured persons; for all the rest, it can do nothing .',l 
Workers' compensation was awarded where the worker's injury was one 'arising 
out of the employment' and suffered ' in the course of employment'. It provided 
the injured worker with eighty percent of his or her earnings, paid periodically. 
Two statutory limitations severly restricted the scheme. The maximum weekly 
payment (as of l December 1966) was $23.7 5. The period over which payments 
may continue was six years. A schedule to the Act measured the percentage 
of any permanent disability, entitling the injured worker to a proportionate amount 
of the maximum weekly compensation. Usually paid in a lump sum, the maximum 
award as at 1967 was $7,343. 
The Woodhouse Commission almost totally rejected lump sum payments for non-
economic loss, founding their recommendations upon a scheme of periodic payments 
based on loss of earnings. Despite t:-iis, the 1972 Accident Comoensation Act 
contained two such provisions - section 119 provided for loss of bodily function 
(which shall be called physical loss ) and section 120 compensated for pain and 
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and disfigurement (which shall be called 
intangible loss ). Their inclusion was !argely dt.!e to the submissions which were 
presented to the Gair and \i\cLachlan Select Committees. 
Had this inclusion not been invoked, it is likely that the Act would not have 
received popular approval and support. ,. ........ ' ·-- .. - .,._~ - t·•" L. ,. • •. 
: :· -;- v (!~. \':~t...Ll.:,;~~~~ 
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Eight years later, an attempt was made on the lives of the two sections. In 
1980, the Government introduced legislation which sought to repeal lump sum 
payments for intangible loss, and to restrict compensation for physical loss to 
injur ies of fifteen percent sever it y and greater according to the schedule to 
the Act. Predictably, this objective was fought with great vigor, with the Unions 
and the Law Society emerging as the main combatants protecting the lump sum 
cause. Victorious, the new 1982 Act retained both lump sum provisions for non-economic 
loss, despite the serious attempts made to terminate their existance. 
This paper argues that the lump sum provisions for non-economic loss formed 
a material term in the social contract represented by the 1972 Acc ident Compensation 
Act. Those rights under the common law and workers' compensation legislation 
were exchanged for the benefits of that Act as it stood in 1972. Any material 
alteration to that contract would necessarily be accompanied by fresh consideration. 
This vital element was absent in the 1980 attempt to alter the contract. 
Part II of this paper indentifies the major opponents and advocates of lump sum 
payments, while Part III considers just what was agreed to in the 1972 exchange 
Part IV discusses the Government's attempt to eradicate sect ion 120 and seriously 
wound section 119, and the retaliation by the pressure groups and from within 
the A.C.C. itself. Part V reviews the outcome of that battle. The conclusion 
will briefly address possibilities for reform. 
II FRIEND OR FOE? 
l. The Woodhouse Commission 
Emphatically, the Woodhouse Commission rejected lump sum payments, recommending 
that except in the case of minor permanent partial disability, compensation was 
best administered under a periodic sc heme. This was subject to commuting to 
lump sums only where "the interests or pressing needs of the person c oncerned 
clearly would warrant this',2 
Compensation for loss of bod ily f unction would be recogn ised and included in 
the period payment. 
The Woodhouse ideal did not anticipate compensating intangible losses: 
"Beneath the Woodho use Re por t 's a tt itude to t he common law me thod 
oi assess ing da ma ges dwelt an a nt ipathy t o t he awa rd fo r int angible loss. 
The ant ipathy was based on t he unarticulated view t hat there was no 
social justif ication for compensating pain and suffering in a no-fault system. 
There was also an underlying feeling that the availability of such compensation 
3 
deflected from recovery. For tactical reasons the point was never 
made explicit; rather the attempt was made to avoid arguments in favour 
of pain and suffering by comparing the recommended new benefits with 
awards at common law to show that the new benefits were superior.',3 
2. The Gair Committee 
Unique in that it was established before the Government had formed any policy 
on compensation for personal injury, this Committee was bi-partisan to a large 
degree. Reflecting upon forty nine submissions, the Gair Comittee diverted 
from the Woodhouse blueprint and incorporated lump sum payments into their 
recommendations. 
Induding compensation for both physical and intangible loss, the Committee 
was swayed by submissions which while recognising the difficulty of calculating 
compensation for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, considered 
that "these heads of damage are however too deeply embedded in our legal system 
to abolish at the present time. 114 
The Committee, however, limited the scope of compensation for loss of enjoyment 
of life from loss of bodily function to cases of permanent disability . Intangible 
loss compensation was "important, but not so important that compensation should 
be available at the levels sometimes awarded in common law claims. In particular, 
very little weight, if any, should be given to temporary pain and suffering
115 
It would seem that the Committee envisaged one provision in any enactment 
dealing with both physical and intangible non-economic loss, recommending that 
this loss be measured against a schedule rating the severity of disability. 
3. The Law Society 
In the preliminary negotiations of the social contract the Law Society found 
its ranks divided over the feasibility and indeed desirability of the Woodhouse 
proposals . Somewhat sceptical in i rs submission to the Woodhouse Commission, 
the Society indicated that "where a system had worked tolerably well in the 
past and is not subject to a demand for change by those most affected by it, 
then we would view with caution the introduction of a new system based upon 
different principles. 116 
One of the subjects of division was the om1ss10n of Jump sum payments in the 
Woodhouse proposals. In its closing paragraph in this submission the society 
resolved that "the Commission be specifically advised that ... there is a considerable 
body of opinion which supports a retention of a lump sum payment for physical 
4 
mJury which does not result in a loss of earnings capacity.',7 
Before the Gair Committee, the Law Society argued inter alia that there should 
be a separate payment for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. Before 
the Mclachlan Committee they contended that these payments should increase. 
It seems that over time the legal fraternity embraced the reform more heartily, 
even at the expense of loss of work. Palmer noted: 
"The legal profession in New Zealand proved to be public spirited. In 
the extensive forays into this part of law reform in various parts of the 
common law world I have not come across a legal profession with as much 
altruism. 118 
4. The Unions 
Undoubtedly the most bitterly opposed of all to compulsory periodic payments, 
the Unions regarded the retention of lump sum awards as vital to the workers' 
welfare. The Federation of Labour (FOL) advocated that "in many cases a lump 
sum settlement is more beneficial to a worker, both from a practical and therapeutic 
point of view, than a periodic payment.119 
The Railway Workers' Unions saw "no compelling evidence pointing to the need 
for the institution and administration of a scheme whereby compensation or damages 
ought to be paid to those entitled on a periodic payment basis. 111 O They praised 
the advantages of lump sum payments as: 
* able to support expenditure in a capital way (for example, the purchase 
of a house, business) 
*conducive to the adoption of a new vocation 
*aiding the purchase of items to help the claimant adjust to his or her 
new condition (for example, the purchase of a car, TY) 
* giving the claimant a measure of independence 
* avoiding 'pension comple< ', which is inflicted through periodic payments 
being a constant reminder to the claimant of his or her affliction. 
Definitively, the Railway Unions concluded that they were "satisfied that the 
suggested institution of a scheme of periodic payments (whether in whole or 
in part) in the place of the present system would be resisted strongly by their 
members and a fo rt io r i 11 it would be res isted strongly by The Railway L nions. " 
Spelt out in clear language was the view of the New Zealand Workers' Union. 
They stated"quite categorically and emphatically that they are bitterly opposed 
to the suggestion that their claim for damages should cease and that injured 
5 
k h ld . '' 12 wor men s cu go on a pens10n. 
The Unions were more concerned with upgrading the Workers Compensation 
legislation with which they felt comfortable, than with widespread social reform. 
They "wanted the best of both worlds: they liked the extended coverage offered 
by Woodhouse, but they wanted to retain common law unless every benefit under 
13 
the scheme was at least as generous." 
They certainly were unequivocally opposed to the lack of non-economic intangible 
loss as proposed by Woodhouse. 
III THE SOCIAL CONTRACT ESTABLISHED IN 1972 
"The use of lump sum payments made lawyers and unionists happier 
than they had been, because it enabled some measure of compensation 
to be made explicitly for intangible loss.
1114 
1. The Legislation 
The Accident Compensation Act 1972 provided separate sections which allowed 
for lump sum payments for physical and intangible loss. After its second Select 
Committee examination chaired by Mr A.A.C Mclachlan, the Accident Compensation 
Bill finally received the Royal Assent on 20 October 1972. Heralded as "an 
historical measure of far-reaching importance in its social, legal and political 
implications 1115 at its first reading by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of Labour, Hon. J.R. Marshall, it was received with lukewarm resignation by 
the Opposition. 
The Act's two provisions for lump sum compensation for non-economic loss 
departed from both the Woodhouse scheme, and to a far lesser degree from the 
Gair recommendations. Section 119 provided that loss or impairment of bodily 
function would be compensated by a lump sum. The maximum was $5,000 for 
100 percent incapacity, calculated pursuant to a schedule to the Act. Section 
120 gave the Accident Compensation Commission a disGetion to pay up to $7,500 
in compensation for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and disfigurement. 




While the successive Minister of Labour, Hon. D. Thompson, regarded that the 
Bill provided "real and indeed as advocated by the 
6 
Woodhouse Commission and the Gair Committee", 
17 
Opposition members were 
less convinced. 
The member for Porirua, Dr. Wall, criticised the amounts available under sections 
119 and 120 as "so small so as not to be rea Uy financially significant from the 
point of view of rehabilitation.
1118 
This doubt was reinforced by the member for Grey Lynn, Mr E Isbey, who had 
been a member of the Gair Committee. 
"I welcome the lump sum provision, but I share the view of my colleague, 
the member for Porirua, that the lump sum payment of $5,000, plus 
$7,500, making a maximum of $12,500, is insufficient for certain serious 
types of accidents.
1119 
The Act extended the compromise reached in the Gair Report which balanced 
the Woodhouse determination to expel lump sums and the pressure groups' fight 
to retain them. The decision to pay lump sums for both physical and intangible 
loss was a direct consequence of the choice not to attribute a notional income 
to non-earners (upon which periodic payments would have been based). Had 
it been otherwise, non-earners would be entitled to very little, if anything, by 
way of compensation under the Act. This would have been a serious anomaly, 
considering the amounts attainable at common law for negligently injured non-earners. 
"Thus the decision not to have a minimum floor of earnings for everyone, 
whether earning or not, necessitated lump sums. Or looked at from the 
other way, the decision to pay lump sums meant that there was less demand 
for an earnings floor.
1120 
Geoffrey Palmer was er i tical of the construction of the lump sum provisions, 
considering that their inter-relationship was confusing. In tandem, they seemed 
to enshrine common law benefits for intangible loss as well as the lump sum 
payments available under workers' compensation legislation. Palmer concluded 
that section 119 probably dealt with the objective elements of non-economic 
loss while section 120 turned to the subjective elements. 
By objective he meant that section 119 compensation was based on objective 
factors such as the loss of a limb, which could be assessed medically according 
to the schedule to the .'\et. This objectivity Y' ds the assessment of any individual 
reference to the claimant, and so leaves little room for argument . In complete 
contrast, section 120 was based on 'notoriously subjective' factors, by its very 
nature. As such it required the individual claimant to be taken into account, 
7 
and this lead to wide potential contention. Palmer regretted that the "elusiveness 
of the common law heads of damages becomes no clearer by reason of their 
. l . . h ,,21 me us10n m t e statute. 
Particularly critical of section 120, Palmer concluded that "(e)ven though the 
number of appeals has been small compared with the number of awards, section 
120 has been the biggest source of contention under the Act during the first 
four years. It has provided the commission with its most serious administrative 
headache. Now that lump sums are in the legislation, it will not be easy to 
displace them. 1122 
IV MANOUEVRES PRECEDING THE 1982 ACT 
1. The Quigley Assault 
Following grumblings that the scheme was too costly, a Cabinet/Caucus Committee 
sought to undertake a review of the Accident Compensation framework. It was 
chaired by Hon. D Quigley. In their report presented in 1980, this Committee 
asked inter alia whether the lump sums provided by sections 119 and 120 should 
be retained abolished, amalgamated or modified. 
Recommendation 8 provided the answer: "That lump sum payments for minor 
injuries be abolished and that except for such injuries resulting in serious cosmetic 
disfigurement compensation payable pursuant to the provisions of section 120 
be discontinued.1123 
The Quigley Report appeared to base its recommendation 8 on four grounds: 
(a) The 1967 Royal Commission argued against lump sum payments. 
The Report quoted Woodhouse J in a paper which he presented w the 
NZ Law Society. His Honour stated with respect to non-economic intangible 
loss compensation that "(s)uch monetary provisions are incongrous as an 
element within a social welfare system .... and there are consequential 
and adverse reactions upon rehabilitation.
1124 
(b) The present system did not minimise the cost and delay of litigation 
as it was designed to do . 
It had been tossed around that approximately forty percent of all 
applications for review were in respect of section 120 awards . 
(c) "Most submissions" favoured the implementa tion of a threshold below which 
8 
The Committee approximated that a fifteen percent threshold would be 
appropriate, alleging that no loss below that figure would normally occur 
which would seriously effect the injured person's earning capacity. However, 
it was also recommended that the commission be given limited discretion 
to ensure the avoidance of serious anomalies in the application of this 
threshold. 
(d) The administration of section 120 "requires subjective judgements by the 
Commission and is a fertile field for litigation and dispute.
1125 
Although recommending the repeal of section 120, the Quigley Report 
acknowledged that lump sum payments in respect of serious cosmetic 
disfigurement were apt. Accordingly, they suggested that section 119 
be amended to incorporate compensation for disfigurement. The Report 
further envisaged increasing the maximum amount available under section 
119 to $17,000. 
2. The Jones Case 
It would seem that the Supreme Court decision m Jones v Accident Compensation 
Corporation 
26 delivered in February 1980 may have influenced the Quigley 
Committee's attitude to section 120 difficulties. This case involved an 
appeal against the decision of the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority, 
who confirmed a lump sum award of $6,500 pursuant to section 120. 
The appellant Mrs Jones had suffered serious injuries in a motor accident m 
January 1976. Prior to the accident, she was a physically active womar: whose 
life revolved around the care of her own and her husband's stables, where they 
bred and trained trotters. After the accident, Mrs Jones' life was drastically 
altered. To quote Casey J's judgment: 
" ... both her knees are disfigured and deformed, with considerable 
scarring; her legs are bowed and she is in considerable continuous pain 
walking with an awkward and ungainly gait ... She suffered from 
depression and at the time of the hearing in April 1978 was being 
treated with tranquillisers. She can look forward to continuous pain, 
probably worsening throughout the rest of her life and cannot walk 
at all on an uneven ground and re c; uires help upstairs.
1127 
Mrs Jones was originally awarded $2000 under section 120 by the Commission. 
This was increased on review by a Hearing Officer under section 154 (2) of the 
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Act, to $6,500 . On appeal to the Appeal Authoritv, Blair J confirmed this decision . 
believing that his duty was to follow the general scheme of the Act to cushion 
the affects of the injury. Thus he dismissed the appeal. 
In the Supreme Court. Casey J considered that the "maior issue before me ....as 
whether the limitation of $10.000 imposed bv s 120 meant that the Commission 
was entitled to exercise its discretion bv fixing its award in relation to a scale 
in which $10,000 represented an appropriate payment for the worse possible in,iurvj 
alternatively .. . that this figure merely reoresented an upper limit or ceiling to 
28 
an award." 
While agreeing that the Act's scheme was to cushion the effects of the injury 
by providing substantial but not total restitution, his Honour found the cushioning 
effect was achieved by the limit of $10,000 . There was "no reason from the 
language of this section to assume that Parliament meant to impose a further 
limit by way of a scale of values within this figure .
1129 
Casey J further enuniciated : 
"On a prooer approach, the award of compensation should have been several 
times the limit of $10,000 imoosed ." 
Thus. he increased the payment to Mrs Jones to the maximum amount. By way 
of post script, one may be puzzled as to the meaning of the word "proper" in 
his Honour's sentence immediately above. While it can be said that it refers 
to the proper method of assessment under the Act, an argument may validly 
be put that ''proper II refers to the approach taken before the Act; that is, under 
the common law. 
It is spec•Jlated that there was widespread concern that this decision in Jones 
v ACC may force open the floodgates of litigation with respect to section 120 
loss . This concern may have been reflected in the Quigley Committee's findings. 
Indeed, as late as before the Labour and Education Select Committee, it was 
the Employer's Federation's view that "that High Courts' view of the principle 
(Jones v ACC) which should be applied in awarding lump sums makes it hard 
to distinguish between serious and less serious cases. 
1130 
3. The F ight Back. 
The Quigley proposals formed the basis of the Accident Compensation Amendment 
(No . 2) Bill 1980. Their recommendations with respect to the lump sum provisions 
for non-economic loss were ensh rined in the infamous clause 20. Predictably, 
10 
this clause called for the repeal of section 120; the amendment of section 119 
to include compensation for disfigurement; and the introduction of a fifteen 
percent threshold under which no lump sum payment would be paid . 
The No. 2 Bill was sent to the Labour and Education Select Committee. Before 
this audience, the battle of the lump sum provisions was fought. 
A. The Law Society 
A tireless battalion, the Law Society included a synopsis of the history of lump 
sum payments for non-economic loss in its submission . 
Describing some of the original Woodhouse proposals as "plainly unacceptable1131 , 
the Society retalliated that had these not been materially altered by the Gair 
Committee, they would never have achieved popular approval. The decision 
to provide lump sum payments was heralded as one such change, and as such 
these lump sums were a material term in the social contract represented by 
the Accident Compensation Act 1972. 
The Society attributed positive benefits, both rehabilitative and therapeutic, 
to lump sums. They : 
* conveyed finality of an unfortunate period m the claimant's life, 
signalling a new beginning 
* offered security so that the claimant need not worry about money 
* provided the means to purchase that which would give the claimant 
the prospect of developing a new interest 
* gave the claimant the feeling that his or her case had been considered 
individually 
* relieved neurosis, or prevented the onset of it. 
The Society counter-attacked each of the Quigley grounds for the changes made 
in clause 20. 
(a) That t~e Woodhouse Commissicn did not favour lump sums ignored the 
fact that these Woodhouse proposals were rejected by the Gair Committee; and 
that the inclusion of lump sum provisions for both non-economic loss categories 
was a part of the social contract accepted in 1972. The Society further advanced: 
"It is clear that Mr Justice Woodhouse would like to see lump sums totally abolished. 
The Cabinet/Caucus Committee's reliance on his views suggests that the present 
11 
proposals for curtailment are a first step towards abolition. If so the position 
should be made clear to the public.
1132 
The Society believed the division between section l l 9's physical loss and the 
intangible loss of section 120 was both"sensible and satisfactory (except that 
the maximum amounts in each case are now so inadequate). 
1133 While 
section l 19's compensation was an acknowledgement of the claimant's actual 
objective disability, section 120 provided a discretion to compensate the individual 
according to his or her specific loss of enjoyment of life, playing an invaluable 
rehabilitative role. 
(b) The argument that the present system did not minimize costly and time-consuming 
litigation as it was meant to, was seen by the Law Society as a gross exaggeration. 
Alleging that the secttvn 120 assessments took at most a tiny fraction of the 
time and cost spent on litigation under the common law, the society retorted 
that "whatever the time and cost that is involved in this method of assessment, 
it is no more than necessary if a just and equitable system is to operate.
1134 
(c) Finding ;-io favour with the proposal to restrict lump sum payments to permanent 
injuries of fifteen percent and greater, the Society was surprised by the Quigley 
Committee's claim that 'most submissions' to that committee had supported 
a threshold. They took issue that all injuries below fifteen percent could be 
categorised as minor, and ones which would avail of no substantial earnings loss. 
The Society gave the example of a concert pianist who lost an index finger 
(fourteen percent disability) to illustrate their grievance. The Society reiterated 
"its opinion that the provision of the lump sums was an integral part of the social 
contract, and regrets having to submit that to deprive a section of the permanently 
disabled of any right to a lump sum is the plainest possible breach of that contract.
1135 
(d) The Society was no more impressed with the claim that section 120 administration 
required subjective judgements by the Commission, and so were rent with the 
possibility of dispute. Submitting that much of this litigation could be attributed 
to the 'parsimonious attitude of the former Commission in relation to claims 
in genera111
36 , the Society concluded that it was necessary to" accept that we 
are all individuals and thus the same disability will affect two of us in different 
37 
ways." Thus, any dispute under section 120 was .; necessary and reasonable 
price which must be paid £or the administration of a just and equnable sysi:em . 
In addition to these disputes, the Society criticised the Government's failure 
to maintain the value of the two lump sum provisions in real terms. They pointed 
out that the $17,000 maximum provided in the proposed section 119 was no more 
12 
than the aggregate in the Act as it stood
38
; notwithstanding that the number 
of potential claimants would decrease dramatically with the proposed fifteen 
percent threshold. In their submission, compensation levels should be indexed 
to ensure their accordance with reality. 
The Law Society had few kind words for the propo·sals m c.!au se 20. Their plan
 
of attack was that the Bill" should be amended so as to restore the scheme 
of the concept which was accepted at the time of its introduction, when existin
g 
common law rights were exchanged for levels of compensation which were seen
 
as realistic in terms of the then money values. The social contract involved 
39 
m that exchange should be honoured and observed." 
B The Unions 
Allied with the Law Society, the Unions showered a sustained attack on the pro
posals 
m clause 20. 
Having always viewed lump sums for both physical and intangible loss as an inte
gral 
part of the scheme, the Federation of Labour and Combined State Unions were 
predictably opposed to the Quigley proposals. They advocated that the "cutback
s 
provided by this clause strike at the very heart of the 1972 social contract.
1140 
These Union's highlighted the grounds for the Quigley proposals in the same ma
nner 
as the Law Society. They concluded that the Quigley Committee ignored the 
fact that the Gair Committee did not accept the Woodhouse proposals in this 
area. They felt unable to answer the allegation that most submissions favoure
d 
a threshold below which no lump sum compensation should be paid, because the
re 
was insufficient detail offered on this point. Further, they believed the cost 
of the scheme "pales into perspect ive when one recalls the huge cost both to 
the state and to the participants, of litigating common law claims in the High 
Court. 1
141 
The FOL and CSU ackowledged that section 120 assessments may have given 
rise to a disproportionate number of applications for review. Nevertheless, in 
their experience, the majority of these were successful, perhaps implying that 
the Commission should have looked more closely at the amounts being awarded 
at the outset. 
Far from abolishing one section and eliminating a large percentage of potential 
claimants under the other, the FOL and CSU submitted that the Bill should prov
ide 
an increase in the lump sum maxima to accord with reality. They further sugg
ested 
13 
that the lump sums should be fixed to the consumers' price index to maintain 
adequate value in real terms. 
The FOL and CSU threatened that if the proposed amendments were implemented, 
they would advocate a return to the common law heads of damages for those 
intangible losses, and physical losses of less than fifteen percent incapacity which 
would be denied compensation under the legislation. 
The National Union of Railwaymen were unequivocally opposed to clause 20. 
In its submission to the Labour and Education Select Committee, the Railwaymen's 
Union advocated that "there is a substantial element of social contract in the 
scheme which evolved through the Select Committees and that many of the changes 
proposed in the Bill will, if implemented, be a serious breach of that social contract.
1142 
In the opinion of this Union, clause 20 was contrary to the Gair Committee's 
recommendations and failed to recognise the very real assistance that lump sums 
provided in meeting the necessary adjustments which faced the injured worker. 
They were unable to accept that the volume and cost of the present review and 
appeal system could even be comparable to the old lit igation system, and with 
respect to delay, they suggested that it was largely of the Commission's own 
making . 
While acknowledging the fairly high proportion of section 120 applications for 
review, in the NUR's experience, "the great majority of these have been totally 
justified by the results. In more than 80 percent of cases the award has been 
increased; in one recent case by as much as $4,500. 
1143 The Union conceded 
that section 120 was not easy to administer by its very nature, but believed 
that its abolition would sacrifice the real compensation concept to adminstrative 
convenience. 
The Union also re je c ted the rec ommendation to abolish lump sum payments for 
permanent disabilities of less than fifteen percent: 
"It should be remembered that it is the manual worker who runs the real 
risk of the alleged minor disabilities to his hands, feet and back, rather 
than the sedentary worker whose major risk of injury at work lies in the 
fi eld of falls in off ice pr e mises.
11 44 
Again like the Law Society, this L' nion critic ised the Government for failing 
to have the lump sum maxima increased to prevent erosion by inflation. 
Lt'·! L:-~:.":'.Y 
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The New Zealand Engineering (etc) Industrial Union of Workers reflected the attitude 
of the other Unions. They were particularly concerned with the proposed fifteen 
percent threshold which they stated would deprive more than 7000 New Zealanders 
per year of compensation. They too threatened that if the threshold was implemented, 
a return must be made to the common law right to sue. 
"People who suffer permanent disabilities must be covered either by the 
Common Law or under the Act.
1145 
The Engineering Union believed it was necessary to retain section 120 to take 
account of the claimant's special circumstances; the proposed depersonalised 
section 119 would have adverse effects on the rights of injured persons. 
Repeating the familiar catch-cry of the major pressure groups, this Union scorned 
the lump sums as warranting an increase, not a cut-back. They cited Jones v 
46 ACC where Casey J held that in the particular circumstances of that case, 
an award of several times the maximum under section 120 was appropriate. 
Worthy of mention is the submission of the New Zealand University Student's 
Association. The students claimed that "(g)iven the nature of our membership, 
we have a special interest in non-earners, low earners and potential earners
1147 
They opposed the need for a threshold, but argued in the alternative that if there 
was a need for one, it should be no greater than five percent. Administrative 
ease should not be achieved at the expense of fair compensation . 
In submitting that the amounts of the lump/shl.~uld be increased, the Students 
pointed out" the particular importance of lump sums to non-earners and potential 
earners in the absense of an adequate system of weekly comensation for those 
48 
people." 
4. The Medico-Legal Working Party 
Recommendation ll(d) of the Cabinet/Caucus Report proposed the establishment 
of a working party to consider the recommended changes to sections 119 and 
120 of the 1972 Act .
49 This having been done, the Report of the Working Party 
hammered yet another nail in the coffin of clause 20. 
The Working Party made no excuses for section 120's subjectivity. They emphasisea 
that it would not be possible to award real compensation for non-economic loss 
unless subjective factors such as the claimant's age, sex, occupation, interests 
and general circumstances were considered in full. This would not be possible 
under section 1 l 9's schedule . 
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Further, the Working Party did not accord with the fifteen percent disability 
threshold, submitting that based on 1977 figures, seventy percent of all present 
permanent disability claims would be eliminated. This would result in a reduction 
of payments of $2,958,772 - that is, thirty six percent of all section 119 payments. 
The party found great difficulty in describing many of the disabilities scheduled 
at less than fifteen percent as minor. 
The Medico-Legal group concluded that it was desirable to retain section 120 
in the Act, together with increasing the maximum award under both non-economic 
loss provisions to a realistic level. To overcome the uncertain situation created 
by the Jones case
50
, they recommended that Section 120 be awarded to include 
a scaling directive to achieve relativity. However, they included no example 
of what shape this directive should take. Moreover, when a claimant ran a 
concurrent claim under both sections, the payments should be awarded separately. 
This was to prevent the section 120 award from detaining the more easily ascertainable 
amount under section 119. 
The Working Party's attitude towards the rehabilitative aspect of lump sum payments 
was crystal clear. 
"Rehabilitation is aided, not retarded, by the prov1s1on of s 120 lump sums. 
It was the unanimous opinion of the Working Party that lump sums are 
helpful to rehabilitation, not only physically but mentally and socially, 
and should be available in addition to the more standard forms of assistance 
provided by the Corporation. 1151 
5.. The ACC Report 
On 10 June 198 l, the Labour and Education Select Committee recommended 
that the Accident Compensation Amendment (No. 2) Bill be held over to allow 
the ACC to reconsider and study it, and to permit the consideration and drafting 
by the Corporation of a new Bill which would avoid the complexity and technicality 
of the existing legislation. 
The ACC Report which followed this recommendation summarised the submissions 
presented to the Labour and Education Select Committee. The Corporation 
devoted a small part oi this summary to the theme of the Social Contract. 
"A wide range of submissions made references to 'the social contract' 
element in the establishment of the scheme whereby certain common law 
rights were exchanged for certain statutorily-defined entitlements. It 
is often argued that the present proposals, in that they involve a 
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reduction in such defined entitlements, constitute a significant breach 
of such social contract.
1152 
The ACC Report recommended that the Accident Committee Amendment (No. 
2) Bill 1980 should be discharged. Bowing under the weight of popular pressure, 
the Select Committee and then Parliament followed this recommendation. This 
signalled inter alia a victory to the advocates of the lump sum provisions for 
non-economic loss. 
V THE AFTERMATH - 1982 
In 1981, the new Bill as rewritten by the ACC was introduced into the House. 
Retaining most of the No. 2 Amendment provisions, this Bill was again referred 
to Select Committee. The Bill which was reported back from the Committee 
was different in many respects to its former shape. 
1. The Legislation 
Promulgated in 1982, the new Accident Compensation Act responded to the battle 
chant of the major pressure groups and retained both lump sum provisions for 
non-economic loss. 
In a more concise Act, section 78 provided a maximum of $17,000 for physical 
loss. Section 78 (6) imposed a threshold of five percent below which no lur,1p 
sums were payable. Section 79 gave the Corporation a discretion to pay up 
to $10,000 for intangible loss. The sum payable under this section was to be 
paid either upon the sufficient stabilization of the claimant's condition, or upon 
the expiration of two years from the date of the accident. Section 79 (5) provided 
that in assessing compensation for intangible loss, regard was to be had "to the 
injured person's knowledge and awareness of his injury and loss." 
However, a closer inspection illustrates a somewhat hollow victory for the lump 
sum advocates. Although retaining the two sections and increasing the lump 
sum maxima from $17,000 to $27,000, the new Act had lost two valuable powers. 
First, it included no recommendatory power by the Corporation to any adjustment 
of lump sum provisions for non-economic, as there had been in section 15 of 
the old Act. Al though this power had never been utilised by the Commission 
under the 1972 Act, its mere presence in that legislation implied potential 
for successful application. 
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Second, section 120 (d) of the 1972 Act gave the Commission extra power in 
special circumstances where it considered that the lump sums due under both 
sections 119 and 120 were inadequate. It was empowered to pay such lump sum 
as it thought fit, provided the figure awarded did not exceed the aggregate. 
This power was struck off the 1982 legislation, probably to combat cost and 
to discourage appeals. 
2. Comment 
It is notable that at its First Reading (16 September 1982), a significant part 
of the debate surrounded the absen6e of any index to which the provisions may 
be attached to keep pace with inflation. 
Hon. J.B. Bolger, the Minister of Labour defended this omission; say mg the 
concept before the House was closer to the Woodhouse Report than the 1972 
legislation. 
"What would happen if the Government were to pick up the other concern 
of the Labour Opposition and have an inflated lump sum compensation 
of $50,000? I can tell the House what would happen. Litigation would 
increase. The bigger the sums of money the greater the litigation, and 
the more QCs involved. It would mean moving away from a no-fault 
. . ' "d" f l f . 1153 automatic compensat10n scneme prov1 mg or a oss o earnings. 
The same rationale was presented in the defence of the t hreshold - that is, that 
earnings related compensation is the major source of compensation under the 
Act. 
At its Second Reading, the Minister of Labour explained: 
"to understand the aim of this compensation measure, one must accept 
that Woodhouse envisaged and supported the concept of permanent compensat ion 
on a monetar y basis, per week or per month, for those who were permanently 
injured, and the lump sum payment was an addendum attached thereto. 
I f h · · l · · II 54. t was not part o t e orig ma propos 1 t 1on . 
Even at the dy ing stages of the battle, the Government was still putting the 
Woodhouse proposals before the legislation that was enacted in 1972. 
VI CONCLUSION . 
Although the advocats of the lump sum prov1s1ons for non-economic loss prima 
facie won the battle, m the final analysis the outcome of the war is still undecided. 
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The lump sum provisions are still in the Act; however their roots do not delve 
very deep into the legislative soil. Sections 78 and 79 are neither protected 
nor entrenched. They are not annexed to the consumers' price index to maintain 
their value in real terms, nor does the Corporation have the power to recommend 
any increase in their maxima. This is left to Parliament. 
Despite their substantial support, it seems that the retertion of the two sections 
was a grudging compromise. It was not wholehearted acceptance that compensation 
for non-economic loss, both physical and intangible, was a material term in 
the social contract achieved in the 1972 exchange. 
It is maintained however that sections 78 and 79 do form a material term in 
the social contract. Pushing to one side the debate over their relative merits 
compared to those achieved by periodic payments; it would seem that the major 
justification for the non-economic loss provisions flows from the fact that the 
Act provides no minimum earnings floor. If in addition to no earnings floor, 
there were no lump sums for non-economic loss, a grave injustice would be 
committed against non-earners. Indeed, such a scheme would never have beeri 
accepted at the outset, such were the suspicions about the proposals in 1967. 
Should the Act ever be extended to sickness, the lump sums would prove an 
insurmountable difficulty . How is one compensated for cancer ? Palmer suggests 
that it "may be possible to make the extension to sickness in consideration for 
the elimination of lump sums.
1155 
Another alternative would be to establish a notional earnings floor, to provide 
earnings-related compensation for all people - real comprehensive entitlement. 
Perhaps this would lessen the need for the lump sum provisions, and provide 
the consideration necessary to strike them out of the contract. 
However, the catch cry of the friends of lump sums was their rehabilitative 
qualities. This may still be prov ided as an addendum to c omprehensive entitlement 
as alluded to above. Thus the lump sum payments would be viewed as a solatium 
- not to provide the ma jor source of compensat ion, but to sympathise with the 
c laimant's misfortune. Such payments would not be large enough to buy a house, 
but would provide the means to develop a new interest, for example. 
If the Scheme is vie wed as a n insu rance pol icy, it may be in order for e very 
working ad ult - whet her self - em ployed, e mp loyee or employer - to contribute 
a minimal amount t o a f und to support a lump sum solat ium payment. As little 
as $10 per annum would provide a sizeable fund. 
Do the provisions for lump sum payments fare v.ell m contrast to the common 
In the year ending 31 / 3/ 85, there were 11, l 05 claims under section 78, 
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and 13,260 claims under section 79.
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Under the physical loss section, 8,641 of the 11,105 claims were completed 
within a 2½ year period. Thus, 22 percent of these claims were not 
fulfilled in this time. 
Under section 79, 10,557 of the 13,260 claims were registered in the 
1983-85 period. Thus, 20 percent were registered prior to 1983, and not completed 
in the prescribed two year period in section 79 (5). 
In the final analysis, lump sum provisions should not be repealed unless there 
is some other scheme to take their place. The 1980 attempt to remove them 
did not afford such consideration. Until this consideration is provided lump sum 
provisions for non-economic loss will remain a material term in the social contract 
established in 1972, and confirmed in 1982. 
Appendix A: Chronological Scheme of the Reform 
1967. Royal Commission of Inquiry set up. 
1969 . Report of the Royal commission tabled m the House of 
Representatives 
1970. Gair Select Committee set up, before the Goverment had formed 
any policy on compensation for personal injury by accident 
Legislation based on this Report. 
1972. McLachlan Select Committee set up -
Accident Compensation Act Passed 
1980 . Cabinet/Caucus Committee set up to review the scheme 
Accident Compensation Amendment (No. 2) Bill based on this Report. 
1981. Labour and Education Select Committee set up. 
1982. Accident Compensation Amendment (No. 2) Bill 
1982 . Accident Compensation Bill introduced; received the Royal Assent same 
year, repealing the 1972 legislation. 
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